The multi-layered air defense system of Israel has provided the country with comprehensive protection from short-range rockets to long-range ballistic missiles and drones coming from state and non-state aggressors. However, despite its advanced level of technological and operational sophistication, it is not impervious. The system has inherent limitations and some vulnerabilities that have been exploited in more recent attacks.
The Cracks in the Shield: Limitations of the Multi-Layered Air Defense System of Israel
It is important to note that the air defense of Israel includes three main components. These are the Iron Dome, which is responsible for intercepting and destroying short-range attacks, the Arrow Systems, which is designed against long-range ballistic missiles, and the David’s Sling, which is responsible for filling the gap between the Iron Dome and Arrow System and intercepting and destroying medium-to-long-rage attacks.
Moreover, aside from these on-site systems, the entire multi-layered air defense system of Israel also benefits from the Patriot Missile Defense System and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense of the United States. These systems are deployed in selected areas in the Middle East. All of these components provide comprehensive protection across different altitudes and ranges. However, despite this multi-tiered design, there are also drawbacks.
Economic Sustainability Due to Operational Costs
One of the main limitations of the air defense system of Israel is the costs associated with its development, operations, and maintenance. It is one thing to develop and implement the system and it is another thing to operate and maintain it. The cost of deploying 10 batteries and associated interceptor missiles for the Iron Dome is about USD 1 billion.
About USD 1.6 billion was spent for the development of the Arrow System. This also included initial production. Both Israel and the U.S. had spent around USD 2.4 billion up to 2007 for the further development of Arrow 2 and Arrow 3. Each interceptor costs USD 3 to 3.5 million. David’s Sling costs USD 150 million for two batteries and USD 1 million per missile.
The recent escalation of conflict between Iran and Israel saw over 400 ballistic missiles launched by Iran in June 2025 alone. An estimate from a U.S. official and a presser from Israeli officials noted that the Israeli government has been spending between USD 188 and USD 285 million per day to intercept Iranian ballistic missiles using Arrow 2 and Arrow 3.
Saturation Attacks and Stockpile Depletion
The interception rate of the entire air defense system of Israel is about 90 to 95 percent based on the June 2025 Iranian missile attacks. There are still some considerations. Effectiveness drops if the system is overwhelmed due to saturation attacks or if attacks come in mixed salvos consisting of missiles across all available ranges and drone assaults.
Hamas launched a saturation barrage on Israel on 7 October 2023. About 3000 rockets were fired in rapid succession in 20 minutes. An IDF report published by the Jewish News Syndicate found that about 50 percent of these rockets broke through due to a combination of interceptor depletion and battery failures. Some batteries also malfunctioned under pressure.
The Iron Dome can track and handle 10 to 15 rockets at once. Reloading can take minutes to hours depending on logistics. David’s Sling is slightly more capable than the Iron Dome because of its centralized radar and faster missiles but reloading is slower. Each Arrow 2 or 3 battery can handle 5 to 10 high-speed ballistic missiles at once but reloading takes hours.
Adversaries with vast arsenals can exploit the limitations of the air defense system of Israel via a barrage of rapid attacks from multiple directions. Moreover, considering the costs of different missiles, the entire system can collapse during a prolonged conflict. Both logistical challenges and supply chain constraints represent a systematic vulnerability.
Range Limitations and Geographical Constraints
Each layer of the air defense of Israel is optimized for specific ranges and altitudes. Remember that the Iron Dome is designed for short-range rockets while the Arrow System handles long-range ballistic missiles. Each component is less effective outside its designated envelope. The entire system must work together for a multi-tiered and multi-layered air defense.
Nevertheless, considering the aforementioned, a compromised component means that the system will not be able to provide full defense. It is also important to note that short-range attacks launched from proximity could overwhelm the Iron Dome because of the narrow interception window. This can be exploited to cripple the short-range air defense layer.
Another limitation of the multi-layered air defense of Israel is the relatively small land mass of the country. It is imperative to concentrate all defense components on highly populated urban areas to reduce infrastructural damage and human casualties. This also means that aggressors can easily focus their saturation attacks on these areas to overwhelm and crack the system.
Advanced Threats and Evolving Warfare
The need to constantly develop and implement newer components to upgrade the system due to advancing missile technologies is also a disadvantage of the air defense of Israel. Hypersonic cruise missiles pose a big challenge because their extreme speed and maneuverability drastically reduce the time available for detection, tracking, and interception.
Both the Iron Dome and the Arrow System were designed to intercept missiles with predictable trajectories or flight courses. Maneuverable missiles like low-flying cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and maneuverable reentry vehicles can change direction mid-flight. This makes it hard for radars to track and interceptors to effectively calculate a hit.
Missiles that deploy multiple independent reentry vehicles or submunitions can also complicate interception. A single interceptor might only be able to engage one warhead, while others continue in their direction, thus further increasing the challenge of saturation. A warhead could be designed to be intercepted while others are intended to target batteries.
Tactics like mixed salvo attacks comprising of unguided rockets, cruise missiles, decoys, and drone swarms can confuse radar systems and overwhelm batteries by making it challenging to prioritize which threats to intercept. Drone swarms are also inexpensive. These swarms alone can overwhelm the whole system because they can consume critical system resources.
Ongoing Workarounds: How Israel is Addressing the Limitations of Its Air Defense System
Israel has taken measures to address the emerging challenges and inherent limitations of its air defense system. All components of the multi-layered defense are undergoing continuous upgrades in software, radar capabilities, and interceptor performance to improve their detection, tracking, and interception rates against increasingly sophisticated threats. Israel is also working to enhance the integration and data sharing between all components and across all assets.
Cooperation with the United States is crucial. To be particular, aside from sharing intelligence and participation in exercises, Israel has been receiving financial and technical assistance to improve its system. The country also depends on American assets like the Patriot Missile Defense System and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense positioned in selected locations in the Middle East to complement and improve further its multi-layered air defense system.
Israel is also developing Arrow 4 and Arrow 5. Both are designed to detect and intercept hypersonic cruise missiles. The Iron Beam will also be a new component of the air defense system. It is a laser-based system designed to intercept short-range threats like rockets, mortars, and drones. Cost is only about a few dollars per shot compared to the thousands of dollars cost of each Iron Dome missile and capability is inexhaustible because it only relies on a power source.
FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES
- Barak, O., Sheniak, A., and Shapira, A. 2020. “The Shift to Defence in Israel’s Hybrid Military Strategy.” Journal of Strategic Studies. 46(2): 345-377. DOI: 1080/01402390.2020.1770090
- Doolan, C. J. 2007. “Hypersonic Missile Performance and Sensitivity Analysis. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets.” 44(1): 81-87. DOI: 2514/1.23160
- Jewish News Syndicate. 3 February 2025. “IDF Report Highlights Failure of Air-Defense System on October 7.” Jewish News Syndicate. Available online
- Linder, C. 17 June 2025. “Israel’s Iron Dome Is Nearly Unstoppable Against Missiles, But a New Laser Weapon Could Make Them Totally Obsolete.” Popular Mechanics. Available online
- Peled, A. 19 June 2025. “Israel’s War on Iran is Costing Hundreds of Millions of Dollars a Day.” The Wall Street Journal. Available online